Target Switzerland Page 2

  Tell’s story takes place just before the Alliance of 1291. According to an early American account, Governor Gessler of Uri, a puppet of the then-occupying Austrians, “placed a hat on a pole at Altdorf, and gave strict orders that every one should pay that hat the same honour as if he were present himself.”3 When Tell repeatedly passed by Gessler’s hat without taking off his own, he was condemned to shoot an apple off the head of his six-year-old son at 120 paces; the alternative was death for both father and son. In a remarkable display of archery skill, Tell succeeded in hitting the apple and sparing the boy.

  The less familiar remainder of the story equally illustrates Swiss virtues of independence and resistance to foreign invasions. After the shooting of the arrow, Gessler asked Tell why he had another arrow in his quiver. Tell responded that, had he injured the child, he would have sent the remaining arrow into the governor’s heart.4

  The governor condemned Tell to life imprisonment for his insolence, but Tell escaped while being transported across Lake Lucerne in a boat. After Gessler’s own boat landed, “in the way to his castle he was waylaid by Tell in a narrow road, who placed the reserved arrow in his heart.”5 This instigated a rebellion in which the Austrian overseers were deposed, and the three cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden swore loyalty to each other—the very event recalled by General Guisan six and one-half centuries later in the face of the Nazi threat.

  Tell’s famous deeds have lived on in the hearts of those who love liberty, not least the founders of the American republic. John Adams, the second President of the United States, devoted a chapter to Switzerland in his Defence of the Constitutions of the United States of America of 1787. Noting that the arsenal at Zurich supposedly contained William Tell’s bow and arrow, Adams quoted from a poem about Tell: “Who with the generous rustics fate, / On Uri’s rock, in close divan, / And wing’d that arrow, sure as fate, / Which fixed the sacred rights of man.”6 Drawing an analogy to the American Revolution and the process of uniting thirteen states into one nation, Adams noted that the canton of Uri, birthplace of William Tell, “shook off the yoke of Austria in 1308, and, with Switz and Unterwald, laid the foundation of the perpetual alliance of the cantons, in 1315.”7

  That latter year was the date of one of Switzerland’s most inspiring victories, the Battle of Morgarten, in which the Austrian invaders were routed and Swiss independence restored. One thousand four hundred Swiss peasants ambushed 20,000 Austrian knights and infantry in a narrow passage, showering them with rocks and driving them into a lake where many drowned. Hapsburg deaths numbered 2,000 to only 12 Swiss.8

  The three cantons which had joined as “companions of the oath” then took their alliance a significant step further and established a permanent Swiss Confederation—the beginning of the nation of Switzerland. The original grouping of the three cantons grew over the course of the fourteenth century to include Lucerne, Zurich, Glarus, Zug and Bern, encompassing much of modern central and northern Switzerland.

  Yet the foreign threat to Swiss independence—and bold Swiss resistance—continued. In 1339, feudal lords from southern Germany and Fribourg sent 12,000 soldiers against the Bernese, who fought back with 6,500 infantrymen. At the Battle of Laupen, the Bernese foot soldiers defeated the enemy’s armored cavalry in open terrain, a first for Swiss warriors and a precedent for all of Europe. Until that time, the mounted knight had reigned supreme on the battlefield, and foot soldiers had been considered militarily—as well as socially— inferior to knights.9

  At the Battle of Sempach in 1386, Duke Leopold III of Austria sent 4,000 armored knights against a 1,300-man Swiss peasant force armed only with halberds and pieces of wood on their arms to fend off blows.10 Folklore has it that during the battle a Swiss fighter named Arnold Winkelried held onto a great number of enemy lances, which had been thrust into his body, long enough to allow his comrades to drive through the Austrian lines. The battle ended with half the Austrian force dead on the field (including the Duke himself) to 200 Swiss casualties.11 Winkelried lives on in Swiss history as one of the Confederation’s greatest heroes.

  In 1388, the Austrians invaded again with a force of 15,000 men but were soundly defeated at the Battle of Näfels by about 650 Swiss, who rolled stones upon the invaders from the summit of a mountain and then “rushed down upon them with such fury, as forced them to retire with an immense loss.”12 The Austrians lost 1,700 men. The Swiss lost only 55—a ratio of almost 30 to 1.

  The Swiss perfected the concept of a well-organized citizenry that could be called out for service at short notice. The ability of the Swiss militia to mobilize immediately would continue to be its distinguishing characteristic over the centuries, right up through World War II. The ruthlessness of the Swiss in battle and their courage was noted throughout Europe. Their fierceness and willingness to fight to the death in defense of their homeland deterred many potential aggressors.

  In the Burgundian War, Switzerland defeated the most powerful army in Europe, led by Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. In 1476, Charles led 20,000 soldiers across the Jura Mountains and persuaded Bernese troops in the Grandson castle to surrender. All 412 Bernese were then hanged or drowned.13 The Swiss mobilized immediately and at the ensuing Battle of Grandson sent the Burgundian army into retreat with heavy losses.

  In the two centuries following the origins in 1291 of the “Companions of the Oath,” Swiss warriors won victory after victory against overwhelming odds in conflicts with surrounding monarchies.

  Charles spent four months preparing an army of 23,000 men for revenge. The Swiss strengthened the defenses at the town of Morat (Murten), through which an invader would have to pass en route to Bern. When Charles laid siege to Morat, the Confederates mobilized an army of 25,000. The Swiss launched a surprise attack, killing 10,000 of the enemy and sustaining losses of only 410. The Swiss took no prisoners, but Charles the Bold managed to escape, only to be killed by a halberd-wielding Swiss the following year at the Battle of Nancy.14 After Morat, the Swiss infantry was the most renowned in Europe.

  Strong defense of the Swiss homeland and the position of Switzerland at the geopolitical crossroads of Europe led to another concept unique to the Swiss military tradition—neutrality. At the Diet of Stans in 1481, the Confederation accepted the advice of the politically influential Swiss monk Niklaus von Flüe (more commonly known as Brother Klaus) to remain neutral during foreign conflicts. Neutrality would deny potential aggressors a casus belli, a reason for war, against Switzerland and would thus itself serve to deter foreign aggression. Further, the Swiss came to see that neutrality was, indeed, necessary to maintain their independence and to ensure unity in a decentralized political society such as the Confederation. It would take another generation before the concept of Swiss neutrality would be truly realized. The threat from abroad, however, would recur throughout Swiss history, including in the twentieth century.

  As Swiss freedom continued to be threatened, the Swiss developed new military tactics to deter foreign invasion. The Swiss pike square— thousands of men massed together with long pikes and halberds— ruled supreme on European battlefields. Cavalry could not penetrate it, and the pike square could outpush opposing infantry formations.

  The attempt in 1495 by the Holy Roman Empire’s Diet of Worms to impose a common penny tax on the Swiss and to subject them to the jurisdiction of an Imperial Chamber of Justice sparked a conflict that would complete the winning of Swiss independence from the Holy Roman Empire. To counter the Empire’s heavy infantry, which threatened invasion from what is today southern Germany, the Swiss built fortifications all along the Rhine River and stayed at the ready for immediate mobilization—a tactic they would repeat in World War II. With the Empire’s defeat at the Battle of Dornach, the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian recognized the independence of the Swiss Confederation in 1501. Other cantons joined the Confederation, which by 1513 comprised a total of thirteen.15

  The Swiss defeat at Marignano, near the Italian city of Milan, at the ha
nds of the French in 1515, prompted Switzerland to adopt a policy of permanent armed neutrality, with no imperialist or territorial ambitions. The contemporary Florentine writer Niccolo Machiavelli, author of The Prince (1532) and a keen student of military affairs, described the battle thus: “if they [the Swiss] did not win the day as they had done at Novara [in 1513, when the Swiss beat the French], they fought valiantly for two days, and, though routed, got away with half their forces.”16 While the Swiss performed bravely, after the battle they finally adopted a foreign policy which allowed only for defensive wars.

  Further, a policy of neutrality was the most logical course within a Confederation of disparate languages, ethnicity and traditions. The decentralized political system of the cantons, under which no leader from one canton was allowed to dominate the others, meant that aggressive wars could not easily be undertaken by the Confederation as a whole.

  Neutrality, of course, could only be maintained by a well-armed citizenry. Machiavelli wrote that “the Swiss are well armed and enjoy great freedom.”17 On his travels through Switzerland, the Florentine observed her citizens army, which he found to be the worthy descendant of the militia of Republican Rome sixteen centuries earlier. As Machiavelli noted, the Swiss were “masters of modern warfare,” but their armed citizenry made them superior only at defense, not aggression:

  [W]hen states are strongly armed, as Rome was and as the Swiss are, the more difficult it is to overcome them the nearer they are to their homes: for such bodies [militias] can bring more forces together to resist attack than they can to attack others. . . . The Swiss are easy to beat when away from home, whither they cannot send more than thirty or forty thousand men; but to defeat them at home where they can muster a hundred thousand is very difficult.18

  By the early 1500s the evolution of Swiss military doctrine, from reliance on the “irresistible” pike square in the open field to once more adopting a strategy of defense, had thus come full circle. This should not be surprising given the small size and limited resources of Switzerland in comparison to her neighbors. Consider Machiavelli’s description of the tactics used by the Swiss and their ability to maintain their freedom despite their modest economic conditions:

  since they are poor, yet anxious to defend their liberties against the ambitions of the German princes . . . the Swiss are obliged to engage an enemy on foot, and therefore find it necessary to continue their ancient manner of fighting in order to make headway against the fury of the enemy’s cavalry.19

  Though modern Switzerland is prosperous, the essential military situation has not changed: a small country in Europe facing potential foes far larger and more populous. As this book will discuss, the Swiss adopted a sophisticated defensive posture in World War II relying on the terrain of the country and the abilities of her well-trained shooters to repel foes. The reliance on a citizens army, rather than a standing army, required that ordinary Swiss constantly practice their marksmanship and military discipline, another tradition of long standing continued to this day.

  A citizens army depends for its success on the cohesion of its units and the absolute devotion of each soldier. During World War II, the Swiss had no tolerance for soldiers convicted of espionage for the Nazis or sabotage. Death sentences were handed down for such activities. Machiavelli had written centuries earlier of the Swiss harshness toward soldiers who expressed fear or deserted from the ranks.

  After their defeat at Marignano in 1515, the Swiss would no longer stray outside their borders, but would concentrate solely on the defense of Switzerland. In 1647, in the “Defensional of Wyl,” the Swiss federal army took over defense of the borders from the cantons. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the European Thirty Years’ War, recognized Switzerland’s independence and confirmed her separation from the Holy Roman Empire.20

  Following Switzerland’s adoption of a national policy of armed neutrality, Swiss troops continued to enhance their reputation as fighters in the service of foreign monarchs, as mercenaries. It became a status symbol among European royalty to have their persons protected by Swiss Guards. When the Parisian mob came for Louis XVI at the Tuileries in 1792, no Frenchman came to his defense. His 600-man regiment of Swiss Guards, however, fought back against overwhelming odds, and nearly all were massacred. In 1848, the Swiss Constitution prohibited any new contracts for service in foreign armies, and in 1859, all mercenary service was prohibited.21 Over the centuries, roughly one million Swiss had served as mercenaries. Today, as the last vestige of what was once a widespread practice, 90 Swiss soldiers continue to guard the Pope at the Vatican, their colorful uniforms a reminder of an even more colorful military tradition.

  The Swiss example of a well-armed citizens army, instead of the standing armies typical of the European kingdoms, attracted the attention of English and American political observers in the eighteenth century, including many of the founders of the American republic. In 1771, the Boston Gazette drew a direct analogy to British rule in America using the example of the Austrian occupation of Switzerland and the patriotic resistance of William Tell. The newspaper’s concluding remark and its application to the British was clear: “Was there not a cause, was it not high time to exterminate such instruments of cruelty?”22

  In its Appeal to the Inhabitants of Quebec of October 26, 1774, the Continental Congress asked their northern neighbors not to let religious differences prevent them from pursuing unity. The Appeal stated:

  The Swiss Cantons furnish a memorable proof of this truth. Their union is composed of Roman Catholic and Protestant States, living in the utmost concord and peace with one another and thereby enabled, ever since they bravely vindicated their freedom, to defy and defeat every tyrant that has invaded them.23

  In 1778, Johann R. Valltravers, a political leader from western Switzerland, wrote to Benjamin Franklin: “Let us be united, as two Sister-Republicks.” He proposed a “lasting Foundation of Friendship, and of mutual good offices between the two Sisters, the 13 republican states of N[orth] America, and of Switzerland.”24 The term “Sister Republics” would stick and was frequently used in nineteenth-century America.

  Once the American Revolution was won, the Swiss experience would figure prominently in the political debates that took place just before the Constitution was adopted. In his A Defense of the Constitutions (1787), a survey of ancient and modern republics and other political models, John Adams discussed the governance of the democratic Swiss cantons and noted two common institutions among them: the right to vote on laws and the right to bear arms. Thus in the canton of Bern, “every male of sixteen is enrolled in the militia, and obligated to provide himself an uniform, a musket, powder and ball; and no peasant is allowed to marry without producing his arms and uniform.”25

  George Mason, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention who was best known for his authorship of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, proposed that the office of President under the new constitution should consist of three persons rather than just one. He conceded that a single person as President had the advantages of unity and secrecy, especially during war. Yet that was also a principle of monarchies, which had been defeated when they invaded republics. Republics without a single leader had advantages too: “Every Husbandman will be quickly converted into a Soldier, when he knows & feels that he is to fight not in defense of the Rights of a particular Family, or a Prince; but for his own. . . . It is this which preserves the Freedom and Independence of the Swiss Cantons, in the midst of the most powerful Nations.” This Swiss-like reliance on the individual soldier fighting to defend his home and liberties was also the secret of the success of the Americans in the Revolution.26 Ironically, Mason’s proposal was similar to the Swiss executive institution of the Federal Council, which was adopted in 1848 and continues today.

  Patrick Henry, whose Revolutionary-era speech with the words “give me liberty or give me death” won him the reputation as America’s foremost orator, eloquently praised the 500-year history of Switzerland, which
“braved all the power of France and Germany,” while retaining its “independence, republican simplicity and valour.”27 He continued:

  Compare the peasants of Switzerland with those of any other mighty nation: You will find them far more happy— for one civil war among them, there have been five or six among other nations—Their attachment to their country, and to freedom—their resolute intrepidity in their defense; the consequent security and happiness which they have enjoyed, and the respect and awe which these things produced in their bordering nations, have signalized them republicans. ...Let us follow their example, and be equally happy.28

  From its beginnings, the United States had a healthy regard for the Swiss example of a decentralized federal state, guarded from invasion by a well-armed and well-trained citizens army. In 1789, in response to the public debate over ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the first Congress proposed the Bill of Rights, which became part of the Constitution in 1791. Two provisions of the Bill of Rights bear the imprint of Swiss influence. The Second Amendment declares: “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”29 The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” These declarations of popular sovereignty and federalism, inspired in part by the Swiss model, remain part of the United States Constitution today. History supported the position of those who argued that the democratic and decentralized character of Switzerland made her militarily stronger, rather than weaker.