Gun Control in Nazi Occupied-France Read online

  On February 16, Laval signed the law creating the Service du travail obligatoire (STO, or Obligatory Labor Conscription), which subjected all males aged eighteen to twenty to being sent to Germany as forced laborers.32 Large numbers of young men fled to the mountains of Haute-Savoie. As Frenay related, those who could “procured sidearms and were ready to defend themselves against arrest.” As an associate said, “They’ve taken to the Maquis.” Maquis literally means a scrub-wooded upland, and the term came to be used to describe the rural armed Resistance in the mountains. Individual members were known as Maquisards. Groups of Maquis composed of a dozen fighters each would grow—the organization Combat gave them instructions and supplied them with food, arms, and ammunition.33

  But they also seized arms from the police, some members of which collaborated with the Resistance. Maquis policy was that “each weapon should bring in at least one other weapon each week.” The Maquis grew quickly, but they were ever lacking in arms and money. A recruitment leaflet read: “Men needed in the Maquis to fight…. Equipment to bring: … firearm if possible….” A unit in the Ain region just had two hunting rifles and two revolvers. Historian Matthew Cobb wrote, “Food and safety were vital concerns, but the key problem for the Maquis—and for the Resistance as a whole—was how to get weapons.”34

  In the search for arms, one never knew who to trust. The German security police (Sicherheitspolizei, or SiPo) and security service (Sicherheitsdienst, or SD) recruited French citizens to infiltrate the Maquis and Resistance groups. An infiltrator helped to break up one Maquis group and then claimed to another group that he had a stock of weapons that the Germans had not found belonging to the first group. Members of the second group fell for the ploy and were arrested.35

  Over time, arms and sabotage equipment were parachuted to the Maquis, who in turn supplied the American OSS with intelligence. Distrustful of American influence, de Gaulle’s people in London sought to sever communication between the OSS in Bern and the Resistance in France.36 Conflict between the French in exile in London and the Resistance in France had been brewing for some time.

  Simone de Beauvoir wrote in her diary that “a strange news item appeared in some Swiss and British papers: ‘Armed rebellion in Haute-Savoie,’ it ran. This was something of an exaggeration. But it is true that such armies were in the process of formation, both in Savoie and Central France; that they were obtaining arms and equipment, and training for guerilla warfare.”37

  In his memoirs, de Gaulle would pay tribute: “By more or less important groups, the Maquis multiplied and began the guerrilla warfare that was to play a role of the first importance in the attrition of the enemy and, later, in the evolution of the Battle of France.” The Maquis—consisting of “few men and fewer weapons”—ambushed supply conveys, derailed trains, attacked patrols, and sabotaged tanks. Triumph meant dead Wehrmacht soldiers and captured weapons; defeat meant being executed on the spot or after a mock trial.38

  Reflecting Vichy’s December 3 and 5, 1942, decrees, the media warned: “The crime of possession of arms shall be tried by the Special Court which shall sentence to death or imprisonment.”39 The words in italics were meant to emphasize the deadly serious consequences.

  René Bousquet, the minister of the interior and the secretary of state for the maintenance of order (le ministère de l’intérieur et le secrétaire d’Etat au maintien de l’ordre), ordered the prefects to compare gun registrations with licensed hunters, obviously to uncover hunters who had not registered their firearms and who still possessed them. Panic abounded in the ex-free zone, and prefectures were overwhelmed by denunciations. Archives in the department of Isère, in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region in the east of France, indicate sixty-three police searches for one pistol, one revolver, three magazines, and twenty-four cartridges. Raids in Haute-Loire uncovered virtually nothing. The prefect of Saône and Loire instructed all mayors to respond that to their knowledge no undeclared weapons were any longer present in their jurisdiction.40

  Separating Barrels from Guns: A Clever Strategy

  As to the countless firearms surrendered to French authorities in the former free zone under the December 1942 decree, nothing was being done to preserve them from rust and deterioration, and the threat loomed that the Germans would consolidate them into depots and ship them to Germany. It was then that Dr. Arnaud, the president of Savoie hunters (des chasseurs de Savoie), with the support of Maxime Ducrocq, president of the Saint-Hubert-Club de France, proposed that the barrels and forends (longuesses)—now rusting away in storage—be returned to their owners for maintenance. In March and April, they proposed it to Laval, who supposedly exclaimed: “[T]hat is the egg of Columbus [c’est l’œuf de Colomb].”41 That meant a problem whose solution is simple, yet clever. Gun owners would be mollified, and the absence of operable firearms that might be stolen from official custody by the Resistance would give Vichy and the Germans less to worry about.

  Ducrocq met with Pierre Laval and the Secretary of State for the Interior Fernand de Brinon with a proposal allowing a twenty-day grace period in which hunting guns could be turned in but the barrels retained by the owners, and returning the barrels of guns already surrendered to their owners.42 This would permit the owners at least to maintain the barrels, which were rusting in storage. Laval wrote Ducrocq promising his support.43 The plan only applied to hunting guns, not to pistols, revolvers, or military arms.44

  The proposal was mentioned by Gruppe We/Ia (Defense Operations Group) in occupied Vichy, expressing grave concerns about the French gaining access to firearms. Pursuant to the Vichy decree of December 3, 1942, civilians in the area controlled by this office had so far surrendered about 300,000 hunting guns and more than 67,000 pistols. The military command ordered that the arms be stored by department and controlled by the French police, subject to German supervision. However, leaving this many weapons in French hands created a grave danger. If the British and the Americans invaded France, the growing number of French opposing the Axis could, with police assistance, seize the weapons and start a guerrilla war. That would gravely endanger the security of the Wehrmacht and limit their freedom of movement. Informers reported a secret Gaullist fighting troop with 200,000 followers.45

  Not only were the population and the police hostile to the Germans, but also it was reported that policemen advised citizens intending to surrender their weapons pursuant to the decree not to do so. The solution? Transfer the arms to depots in places where the Wehrmacht was stationed. The civilians could retain their ownership rights. Moreover, the prefect of the department Drôme in southeastern France reported to the Germans that Vichy was considering whether barrels could be returned to their owners for maintenance, leaving only the frames and shoulder stocks in the depots. The Germans would not oppose that.

  The same document by Gruppe We/Ia noted that the Army Control Delegation for the Alps Section (Heereskontrolldelegation für den Alpen-Abschnitt, DECSA) reported that arms dealers were still selling weapons to civilians. The weapons included centerfire long guns with both rifled and smooth-bore barrels, repeating centerfire carbines of 6 mm or smaller caliber, and semiautomatic centerfire pistols of 6 mm or smaller caliber. The dealers justified these sales with the exclusion from the Vichy decree of weapons of the seventh category, but that only included shooting gallery and salon arms. Since the weapons being sold could shoot at considerable distances, the document argued, they should be banned. The prefects claimed to be powerless without orders from Vichy.

  As noted, Gruppe We/Ia perceived the French population and police as hostile to the Germans. While few French supported resistance before the roundups of the Jews at the Vélodrome d’Hiver in July 1942 and the creation of the Service du travail obligatoire in February 1943, those events greatly increased support for the resistance groups. While some collaborators and members of the Milice would support Germany to the end, the German assessment at this point was that neither the people at large nor the police could be trusted, particularly if
they could seize confiscated firearms being held by the Wehrmacht or by French authorities.

  District Headquarters 635 in Béthune reported several instances in which French civilians found unusable weapons of war, such as rifles and revolvers, in open fields or empty lots, and surrendered them.46 More seriously, on January 28, 1943, unknown perpetrators killed Robert Zacrzewski, the head of the German Cultural Community in Hulluch, with two shots from a pistol while he was on his way from his apartment to the bus stop. On February 24, three soldiers at the restaurant “Oskar” in Lens were threatened by two “bandits” with pistols. The bandits took an 08 Lugar pistol from one of the soldiers and pay booklets and money from the other two, fired two shots, and escaped.47

  While there was no wave of organized armed resistance at this time, there was much to do. The resistance publication Notre Parole (Our Word) advised Jews to hide their children with others and join the partisans. “Arm yourselves and fight for the destruction of the brown-shirted barbarians, if you do not want to be destroyed yourselves!”48

  Admiral Jean Platon, secretary of state at the Office of the Head of Government, wrote from Vichy on March 9, 1943, to General Alexander Freiherr von Neubronn, liaison officer of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander-in-chief–West, regarding the surrender requested by certain German authorities of pistols and revolvers handed over to the French civilian authorities by civilians. He related that General Hans Schuberth ordered prefects to surrender all firearms turned in under the decree of December 3, 1942. Yet the prefects were not under any obligation to do so, as the decree, approved by the Germans, mandated that the French police secure weapons surrendered by civilians. He requested that, without further agreement, the local German authorities refrain from insisting on the surrender of hunting guns stored under the supervision of French gendarmes.49

  The Control Authority of the German Armistice Commission at Bourges, the supervising office on such matters, directed an inquiry regarding privately owned French weapons to the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden, Germany. It noted that, after the invasion of the formerly unoccupied territory, the French government, at the request of Rundstedt, ordered the surrender of all weapons in private possession to the pertinent prefects. The French ministry of the interior ordered that the confiscated firearms be used as equipment for police officers and other purposes.50

  Yet it needed to be decided, the Control Authority continued, whether to order the French to hand over the weapons. As previously ordered, weapons, ammunition, and war equipment of any kind had to be surrendered, requiring determination of which items in depots were included. If only weapons of military origin were required to be surrendered, the question arose whether weapons of private origin that could be used against the German army (for example, shotguns, small caliber rifles, revolvers, pistols) should be stored and administered with or separately from the hunting guns.

  Transport All Hunting Guns to Germany for Safekeeping?

  General von Neubronn responded to Admiral Platon that it was intended to transfer all of the hunting guns from the previously unoccupied territory to Germany. Hunting guns included not only actual guns used for hunting, but also all civilian arms such as pistols surrendered under the French decree of December 3, 1942. Reassuringly, he noted (joked?) that the French owners would keep their ownership. But the arms could not be safely secured in France.51 Neubronn then telegraphed Rundstedt: “Laval called the note regarding the transfer of all hunting guns to Germany as having a great effect on the mood, in particular of inhabitants of the flat land. Since he considers the note as also disquieting for German interests, he plans to make counter-proposals.”52

  Next, the regional prefect’s office in Clermont-Ferrand sent a note to the Armistice Commission in Royat. It first recited that the laws of December 3 and 5, 1942, exempted from the prohibition on possession of firearms officials and employees of the public administration who were subject to attack, such as gendarmes, police officers, and judges. Unusable weapons with only collector’s or sentimental value were also exempt. Ministerial orders had also exempted prefects, mayors, and a number of other government officials and guards.53

  Lieutenant Colonel Wittig of the Control Authority in Bourges wrote to the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden concerning the arming of French officials and government personnel. A regional prefect advocated arming railway guards while on duty; militia members, who supported the government but were attacked by opponents of the government; and exempted people, such as mayors, of which there were 463 in the department Puy-de-Dôme alone; and the new police recruits. The pistols and revolvers would be taken from the hunting rifle depots, which was already occurring in some regions.54

  Army Corps General Eugène Bridoux, French secretary of state for defense, wrote to Neubronn regarding the transfer to Germany of the weapons surrendered to French civilian authorities pursuant to the law of December 3, 1942. He noted that the hunting guns were not attack weapons, and that—as Admiral Platon had predicted—transfer of the guns to Germany would cause discord. Measures could be taken to keep the weapons secure.55 In response to information on April 12, 1943, that Control Group (Kontrollgruppe) Châteauroux, a German authority based in the town of that name, had ordered the immediate loading of hunting guns for transport to Germany, Wittig was instructed that the negotiations regarding the hunting guns were not yet concluded, and that actions must stop until a final decision was made.56

  Rundstedt requested that the French government list all weapons surrendered under the December decree and categorize them as military weapons, including rifles, pistols, and ammunition, and hunting guns and ammunition. The prefects should be reminded of their responsibilities to store and guard these private weapons.57

  On April 19, Lieutenant-General Heinrich Niehoff, commander of the army area, southern France, at Lyon, wrote to Rundstedt’s quartermaster that all firearms confiscated under the French decrees of December 3 and 5 were under the control of the German army inspector, who proposed that Niehoff take over privately owned hunting guns. The Armistice Commission should proceed rapidly with the sorting of weapons fit for military use (military weapons, rifles, pistols, revolvers) and of ammunition (including bullets) from French weapons depots. Liaison officers would take over hunting-gun depots, under the supervision of the prefects, until Rundstedt issued the order to ship them to Germany. It was considered “absolutely necessary that the weapons … are taken out of the Army area because they could very easily be used by guerrillas, most notably in street battles.”58

  The fear was not unfounded. On April 14, French police conducted a weapons check in Grenay and stopped two men who looked like miners. When asked for his papers, one of them pulled a pistol from his left breast pocket and shot police officer Louis Guilluy, but the weapon failed to fire when he tried to shoot another officer. The second miner pulled a pistol and shot at an officer but missed. The attackers escaped unidentified.59

  On April 15, the MBF ordered that hunting guns be available for purchase by Wehrmacht troops who held hunting permits for occupied France at the hunting-gun depot at the château of Vincennes on the eastern edge of Paris, starting on April 20. It included a list of 22 kinds of hunting guns with prices between 8 and 500 Reichsmark.60 Soldiers could select guns each workday between 8:00 a.m. and noon; paid-for guns could be picked up in the mornings or between 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. Three-barrel guns and sporting rifles were unavailable, and the following were sold out: small caliber rifles, Browning rifles, new self-cocking double-barreled guns with ejector, self-cocking double-barreled guns with side lock and ejector, and similar guns.61

  As for the hunting guns surrendered to the French authorities under the December 1942 decree in the newly occupied territories, Rundstedt reminded the French government that for military security reasons these guns would be transferred to the Reich for storage. In a letter to General von Neubronn, Rundstedt’s liaison officer, French Admiral Platon requested that any valuable parts of these hun
ting guns be returned to their owners. Maxime Ducrocq, in his role as president of the International Hunting Council (Conseil International de la Chasse), made the same request. After further review, the German side agreed on June 7, 1943, that the barrels and locks of hunting guns could be returned to their owners, and the stocks and triggers would be collected and stored under German control.62

  Ducrocq wrote to Neubronn, expressing thanks for introducing him to Colonel Cullman in Vichy. After the two met in Paris and Saint-Germain, Cullman wrote Ducrocq that Rundstedt supported Laval’s request concerning the weapons deposited in the formerly unoccupied territory. Rundstedt was informing the French government that he had rescinded his previous decision to transport the weapons to the Reich and instead would order them dismantled on location. The Germans expected that the dismantling and return of the barrels would take three months, and that the stocks and triggers would be stored under German control.63

  Laval’s Betrayal: The Compulsory Labor Service

  A bird’s-eye view of a day in the life of Pierre Laval in this period is suggested by a newspaper report of his schedule on the afternoon of June 17, when he met at the Hôtel Matignon, the official residence of the prime minister in Paris, with Messrs. Cathala, minister secretary of state for national economy and finance; Darquier de Pellepoix, commissioner for Jewish affairs; Sailly, head of economic control; Maxime Ducrocq, president of the International Hunting Council; and Prefect Lacombe, head of the wartime protection service. This appeared under headlines on the Fortress Europe and Luftwaffe attacks in Sicily.64