Target Switzerland Read online

  After the fire at the Reichstag (Parliament) in Berlin the following month, random massive searches and seizures were authorized; “serious disturbances of the peace” were punishable by death. Nazi thugs attacked members of the democratic parties and hauled them off.3 By early March, Hitler was an absolute dictator. The Parliament had ceased to exist as a true legislature and the regional German states were taken over by the central authority.4 The government became an instrument of terror.5

  In neighboring Switzerland, the press reacted negatively against the new German regime with such articles as “The Dangers of the Hitlerite Dictatorship” in Geneva’s leading newspaper, the Journal de Genève. The Journal began to run a regular column on the subject of Nazi Germany featuring snippets about police actions against political opponents, who seemed invariably to be described as “Communists.”6

  From early in the Nazi regime, the military threat to Switzerland was plain to see. Ewald Banse, a Nazi military theorist and geographer who advocated barbaric methods of warfare,7 had published Raumund Volk in Weltkriegen (Space and People in World War) in late 1932. The Nazis appointed him Professor of Military Science in February 1933 and in July established the German Society for Military Policy, in part to promote Banse’s ideas.8

  Banse frankly asserted that a war against France, Germany’s historic enemy, could be favorably waged only by attacking through the neutral nations of Belgium and the Netherlands in the north and through Switzerland in the south.9 A key invasion path led through the Jura range and the Bellegarde (Geneva) Gap.10 “Swiss neutrality, in fact, is of service only to the French, and not to us,” Banse asserted.11

  Banse rightly anticipated, however, that Switzerland would be a far harder nut for any foreign enemy to crack than the Netherlands. Topographically, the Jura contained lower mountains and valleys; even the central plateau, with its hills, streams and lakes, afforded “the chance of a stubborn defense against foreign invasion.” As for the Alps, these were high mountains full of great rock masses, precipices and valleys—all watered by rushing torrents and topped by snowy pinnacles.12 Such terrain would impede the movement of large forces.13

  Despite its majority German-speaking population, Banse used Nazi racial theories to describe the Swiss as an inferior amalgamation: “Like Belgium and the United States of America, Switzerland has no people, but merely a population made up of different races.”14 There were Germans, French, Italians and Rhetians. As for the majority:

  The German Swiss imagine that in conjunction with the three other racial elements which speak foreign languages they constitute a single nationality, and they dig an artificial trench between them and ourselves, which is deeper and wider than Lake Constance [part of the German-Swiss border]. This conception, which they uphold with all the impartiality of the Eastern race, is the intellectual basis of the Confederation, which would otherwise have no reality, since the Latin elements have no such deep conviction.15

  Banse expressed great resentment against the German-speaking Swiss for what he rightly perceived as their dislike of the kind of Nazi political ideology he espoused. He wrote:

  From the military point of view, therefore, the character of the German Swiss is the decisive factor. . . . Its decisive features, however, are a calculating materialism, unlimited self-reliance and a tendency to criticism, not to say faultfinding. The latter tendency is directed mainly toward their German kinsfolk across the Rhine, and reminds us of the pelican which pecks its own breast. . . . This childish dislike needs to be taken very seriously indeed and is an important fact fraught with possible military consequences, being of itself equivalent to a strong army corps, and much more dangerous than the anti-German feeling of the Alsatians, since it is based upon the belief, doubtless justified in the Middle Ages but long since obsolete, that liberty and equality—those most sacred of human possessions—are at stake.16

  While most of the world paid little attention to the disturbing nature of the new German regime, the Swiss were repelled by Nazism. On May 12, 1933, the Swiss Federal Council (the collective government of the country, from whose membership one Federal Councillor is selected to serve as Federal President each year) prohibited the wearing of “Hitlerite” uniforms and insignia and subjected violators to imprisonment or deportation.17 On July 9, Federal Councillor Rudolf Minger, a farmer who headed the Military Department in the years from 1930 to 1940, declared in the ancient Roman amphitheater at Windisch in northern Switzerland:

  Never will our people agree to weaken our democracy; it will defeat dictatorial ideas from whichever side they come. Never will our people accept a German-style Gleichschaltung [conformity]. In Swiss fashion we will hold in order our Swiss house. For this purpose we do not need extra shirts nor extra flags; the white cross in the red field will suffice. The Swiss will also defend the right to utter his opinion freely. . . . We will ever hold dear our federalist attitudes and be happy our people encompasses different languages and races. This is the best guarantee that our nation will, in times of war and of great international tensions, not be seduced by irresponsible political temptations.18

  For the Swiss, the “armed” in armed neutrality was not merely a matter of maintaining a strong national defense force, but imposed responsibilities on the individual citizen. The 1933 edition of the manual issued with the rifle given to every Swiss male on reaching military service age stated:

  In combat, I have my rifle to overcome the enemy. It is the symbol of the independence and force of my fatherland, Switzerland, which I love and which I want to defend all the way to the last drop of my blood.19

  The Swiss rifle “bible” went on to explain that a man must make it a pleasure to maintain his rifle. It was to be stored in a closet at home.20 One was to practice constantly in both prone and kneeling positions and should be an active member of a shooting society. These voluntary shooting societies were considered an important element in the defense of the country.21

  To fire accurately, the manual asserted that one should not shoot fast. Instead, one should pull the trigger slowly, using intelligence and judgment, and remember: “The conqueror always has another cartridge in his rifle.”22 The trigger was to be pulled only if the target would be hit. After each shot in combat, one should pause and observe. One had to shoot more accurately than the enemy and skillfully use the terrain.23 Furthermore, each soldier was required to be engaged in marksmanship activities outside service until past age 40. This was a military duty one was obliged to fulfill each year with his own rifle and in a shooting society.24

  The SSV, or Swiss Shooting Federation, was the backbone of the armed citizenry, which the New York Times termed in an August editorial “the army in civil life.” The SSV’s strong opposition to totalitarianism of both right and left was clear: “We want to think Swiss and to remain Swiss. Away with all foreign behavior. We need no brown, green or red uniforms or shirts; we marksmen know only one uniform and that is our field-gray, our honorary dress.”25

  While Swiss rifle shooting matches were conducted at the standard 300 meters, soldiers were trained in marksmanship at 50 to 300 meters and even shot at 400.26 These were very long distances compared to the relatively short ones from which infantrymen typically fired at one another during the world wars. But the ability to snipe at such distances in mountain terrain would have given the Swiss a great advantage in combat with the Germans, who were only trained to shoot at 100 meters.

  Hugh Wilson, American Ambassador to Switzerland from 1927 to 1937, described the Swiss citizen soldier: “The Swiss citizen retains his uniform and rifle at home, ready for instant mobilization; and he spends many of his Sundays qualifying for marksmanship awards with his friends in his community as men of other nationalities spend their leisure at golf, fishing, or other recreation.”27

  Hitler would in time be able to conquer most of Europe and much of Russia, but the armed Swiss population was an unappetizing potential conquest for the much larger German Army. In Switzerland, every man was trained wit
h a rifle and was used to shooting accurately at 300 meters. No other European country offered this kind of disincentive to aggression.

  On August 9, 1933, Nazi police trespassed on Swiss soil at Basel to search for Communist leaflets.28 Nazi demonstrations near the border later that month were making the Swiss very uneasy. Large crowds gathered in support of Swiss democratic institutions and the army.29 Nazi meetings, though well advertised in the German-speaking Swiss cantons, drew few enthusiasts. The New York Times observed the political climate in Switzerland:

  The decline of Hitlerism can be ascribed to two main causes. First, there has been a revival of Swiss patriotism as a consequence of psychological errors in the German Nazi propaganda. The Swiss also feel that the Nazi movement may at any moment threaten their independence.30

  In its September 12 issue, the Journal de Genève reported Swiss sentiment as follows: “The attitude of Berlin toward Vienna proves to us that Hitlerism is an article of export. . . . Swiss independence counts for no more beyond the Rhine than does Austrian autonomy. No one need therefore be astonished if Swiss opinion remains agitated and anxious in the presence of the evolution of the Third Reich.”31

  The Petit Parisien published an article in September by the English journalist “Augur” (the pen name for M. Poliakoff) entitled “A Plan for the Invasion of Switzerland Preferred by the German General Staff.”32 It created a sensation in the international press and was, of course, carefully analyzed in the Swiss newspapers. Augur was described as a well-informed political commentator.33

  The theme of the plan was “Geneva, Doorstep to France.” It expressed a low opinion of the ability of the Swiss Army to resist, arguing that its soldiers were good but lacked training in modern armaments and equipment. Arms and munitions factories were located predominantly in the north, near Germany, and could be readily destroyed. To avoid a decisive defeat as early as the first day, therefore, the Swiss Army would withdraw to the mountains of central Switzerland, where it would be cut off from France. The wives and children of the battalions from the northern districts would remain in the hands of the Germans as hostages, which would undermine the troops’ morale, for fear of reprisals.34

  Without encountering any serious opposition in the northern Swiss plain, the German Army would then march right to the Jura. The German forces would rush to the south of Belfort, France, under its fortifications, and the main army would quickly march alongside the Jura, its right flank protected by the Lake of Neuchâtel. The initial goal to reach was the Léman Line, close to Geneva. Geneva was the gateway to France and particularly important for the seizure of Lyons, France, with its surrounding arms and munitions factories.35

  Augur asserted that the precise information contained in the aforementioned German plan established its authenticity. The Journal de Genève commented, however, that even if the plan were real, it could be merely a technical study such as general staffs would routinely compose, as opposed to a plan intended for actual use.36 The plan could also have been a fabrication intended to incite hostility against Germany and its rearmament or to create support in France for fortifying the region of Lyons.37

  Two conclusions were in order, according to the Journal. First, the Swiss people had the right to know if this invasion plan, which threatened their security and independence, was real. The Federal Council was urged to investigate the subject thoroughly.38 Second, the very fact that an eventual violation of Swiss neutrality was being publicly discussed showed the necessity of maintaining a strong national defense. In 1914, no army invaded Switzerland because her army was sufficient to deter every belligerent. In 1933, all precautions had to be taken so that the troops received modern equipment that inspired confidence in their capacity to resist.39

  In Germany, Reich Defense Minister von Blomberg called the article by Augur “highly imaginative nonsense.”40 On September 26, at a League of Nations meeting in Geneva, Swiss Foreign Minister Giuseppe Motta “categorically explained to Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels that such an idea would be totally absurd. In Germany, no rational person would have in mind jeopardizing the existence of the Swiss Confederation.”41 Goebbels reassured him that Germany wanted nothing more from the Swiss than friendship.42

  Despite Goebbels’ lack of credibility, the French did have an interest in publicizing the supposed invasion plan, because their Maginot Line stopped near the Swiss border. Any improvement in Swiss defenses would in effect become an extension of the Maginot Line and further secure the French southern flank. Subsequent Swiss defensive preparations, combined with the rugged Swiss terrain, would, in 1940, encourage the Nazis to attack more vulnerable armies and easier terrain.43 In fact, it could even be said that the Swiss in essence extended the Maginot Line eastward from its southern tip near the French-Swiss border all along the border with southern Germany to Austria. The fortifications and infantry positions essentially reached all the way from France to the Sargans fortress in eastern Switzerland, which pointed its guns toward Austria.44

  On October 10, 1933, Swiss Defense Minister Rudolf Minger cited the reported German invasion plan to justify increased appropriations for armaments. The Parliament voted a credit of 15 million francs ($4.5 million) as the first installment of a multi-year budget of 100 million francs ($30 million).45 This was a sharp upward turn. For years, following the horrors of the Great War, and with the Socialist Party’s opposition to militarism, military budgets had steadily declined.46

  On October 14, Hitler announced that Germany intended to withdraw from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. The Journal de Genève asserted: “The thunderbolts hurled on Saturday by Berlin have quite naturally provoked an explosion everywhere. It is an explosion of indignation, of inquietude . . . and of distrust toward Germany.”47

  On October 18, the Federal Council responded to Germany’s withdrawal from the League by resolving that “there should be no doubt anywhere concerning the will of Switzerland to defend her neutrality and her capacity to do so.”48 The Council was expected to adopt Minger’s proposal to increase appropriations to purchase arms for the infantry, as well as airplanes.49 On November 16, the equivalent of $39 million was appropriated for new rifles, machine guns and artillery.

  Swiss commanders planned increased defenses at the German border, just as Belgium was instituting along its own border with Germany.50 In view of their military preparations, it was questioned whether the two countries were truly neutral; however, the more important question was whether Adolf Hitler would respect the international treaties under which their status was guaranteed. According to an article in the New York Times, the Germans would attack France through Switzerland, “crossing the Rhine upstream from Basel and penetrating to France along what tacticians call the Corridor of Bel-fort.”51 While the route through Belgium was easier, analysts observed, the Swiss route would offer a greater element of surprise.52

  The issue of Swiss defense, said the Times, was “singularly acute since the advent of Hitlerism, and there are numerous Swiss nationals who are asking whether Switzerland’s neutrality would be respected if her territory became strategic to another conflict.” Fortifications were being constructed on the Rhine.53 Federal President Edmund Schulthess stated, “Our people are schooled by the ages in democracy and do not allow themselves to be greatly influenced by propaganda.”54

  As the war scare continued, on December 14 the Federal Council approved 82 million francs in military spending.55 Defense Minister Minger stated:

  The 300,000 Swiss subject to mobilization will hold from valley to valley, from mountaintop to mountaintop, from river to river. . . . Whoever raises the slightest doubt about this fools himself badly. Any belligerent who tries to cross Switzerland will have to reckon with the entire Swiss Army.56

  Besides Switzerland, there was another German-speaking nation in Europe: Austria. On the first page of Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler had declared that “Common blood must belong to a common Reich” (“Gleiches Blut gehört in ein gemeinsames Reich�
��).57 He referred to Austria and Germany as “two German states which we of the younger generation at least have made it our life work to reunite by every means at our disposal.”58 Hitler told the Reichstag on January 30, 1934, in a speech marking his first year in power, that what was happening in Germany “will not halt at the frontier posts of a land which is German not only in its people but in its history as well, and which was for many centuries an integral part of the German Empire.”59

  Switzerland would be Hitler’s goal after he conquered Austria, argued G.E.W. Johnson in the June 1934 issue of North American Review. He wrote that a “slugging contest that is now being waged between the two Austrian-born Chancellors: Hitler, the ‘little corporal’ of Berlin, and Dollfuss, the ‘Millimetternich’ of Vienna, to decide whether or not Germany is to eat Austria for breakfast.” The Swiss feared that if Austria were “served up for breakfast, it will be Switzerland’s turn to furnish the lunch.” After all, the Nazis claimed to “voice the aspirations not alone of the sixty-five million Germans who live in Deutschland, but of the eighty million ‘Germans’ who comprise Deutschtum [the greater German Empire].”60

  Like a “restless swarm of termites,” wrote Johnson, the Nazis “bored from within,” to subvert regions with a German-speaking majority: Danzig, the Saar, Austria and Switzerland.61 Their intentions, based on kinship of blood and speech, were to incorporate Switzerland within a Greater Germany by an appeal to the historic past.62 During the Middle Ages, Switzerland had been part of the Holy Roman Empire, the “First Reich” in Nazi terminology, of which Hitler’s was the Third. The Nazis now were proclaiming that they intended to “expand Germany’s boundaries to the farthest limits of the old Holy Empire, and even beyond.”63 None other than Professor Ewald Banse, responding to Swiss criticism of his geographical textbook expounding German claims to Switzerland, stated: