Target Switzerland Page 7

  On August 24, the Socialist Party in Basel obtained enough signatures for an initiative to ban the National Socialist Party and its propaganda. It obtained the highest number of signatures ever gained for an initiative.31

  Contemporary Review reported that the German press had no success in frightening the Swiss people with Bolshevist conspiracy theories or in generating anti-Semitism. Swiss courts penalized authors of propaganda who asserted that various Swiss personalities were “being paid by Jews” and who argued that Switzerland was under the influence of “international Jewry.”32

  Although the Swiss people as a whole opposed the racist doctrines of National Socialism, the Swiss government was, regrettably, unwilling to grant unlimited asylum to political refugees or free emigration to German and Austrian Jews. The liberal entry policies which had existed since 1933 were curtailed in October 1938 by the Federal Police Department under Heinrich Rothmund, who accepted a suggestion by German officials that a “J” stamp be added to identify Jews on German passports. The police chief’s role was not made public until 1954, at which time the Swiss public was outraged. On behalf of the nation, Federal President Villiger issued a public apology in 1995.33

  Czechoslovakia, another country in the threatening shadow of Nazi Germany, resembled Switzerland in that her people consisted of an ethnic and linguistic mix. Despite promises made when the country was formed at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, however, Czechoslovakia had not adopted a federal system of Swiss-like cantons. The Sudeten Germans—German-speakers in the western part of the country near the German border—had a number of grievances against the highly centralized government. They were thus ripe for Hitler’s attention and would be handed over to the Nazis with only the signatures of a few Prague politicians on a scrap of paper.34 In 1938, the perception grew that the British were willing to let the Sudetenland be ceded to Germany, even though it meant the complete loss of border fortifications for that part of the country which remained.35 On September 15, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain promised Hitler to promote the cession.36 Despite treaties protecting the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, Britain and France told Czechoslovakia’s representatives that the country must accede to Hitler’s wishes.37

  By then Hitler was emboldened, and world crisis loomed. President Roosevelt announced that the United States would remain neutral in the event of war and would not participate in the ongoing negotiations regarding Czechoslovakia.38 He nevertheless appealed to Hitler and Czech President Eduard Benesˇ not to break off talks and asked other governments to make similar appeals. The Swiss Federal Council, on September 28, urged Hitler and Benesˇ, “with deep emotion,” to find a peaceful solution.39

  After the Führer received another appeal from President Roosevelt, the German minister in Bern, Otto Carl Köcher, asked the Swiss Political Department whether Switzerland authorized Roosevelt to speak on her behalf and whether the Swiss felt threatened by Germany. The Federal Council answered the first question in the negative, but replied to the second that Switzerland relied for her independence on respect for her armed neutrality, which Germany had recognized. Berlin was displeased.40

  Chamberlain and the French premier, Edouard Daladier, again acquiesced to Hitler, at Munich on September 29–30, 1938. Backed by Britain and France, under the Munich accord finalized on the 30th, Germany demanded that Czechoslovakia give up 11,000 square miles of her richest and most defensible territory along with 3.5 million citizens. The transformation was arranged after the Western powers dictated the terms. President Benesˇ conferred with his military and political leadership, concluded that resistance was futile and that surrender to the Diktat was his only alternative. What was left of the country then became known as “Czecho-Slovakia.” A pro-German government was installed.41

  Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the German High Command, would later testify at Nuremberg that “we were extraordinarily happy that it had not come to a military operation because . . . our means of attack against the frontier fortifications of Czechoslovakia were insufficient. From a purely military point of view we lacked the means for an attack.”42 Similarly, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein admitted that “there is no doubt whatsoever that had Czechoslovakia defended herself, we would have been held up by her fortifications, for we did not have the means to break through.” In fact, the German Army General Staff opposed a European war and was plotting to overthrow Hitler had they been ordered to attack Czechoslovakia at that time.43

  Germany was not then prepared to go to war against a coalition of Czechoslovakia, Britain, and France; however, Hitler’s ability to bluff foreign leaders had earned the Third Reich another bloodless victory.44 Chamberlain gave the Führer what he wanted. The Western powers betrayed Czechoslovakia, the leaders of which then gave up without a fight.

  The Swiss, however, were not demoralized. The decentralized Swiss state did not lend itself to the tactics Hitler had used on Czechoslovakia and Austria. Bluffs and intimidation against Switzerland’s grass-roots democracy only made the Swiss more determined to preserve their independence and way of life.

  While the world celebrated the Munich accord, with its promise of “peace in our time,” and the Pope expressed joy that war had been avoided, Federal President Johannes Baumann said at the closing of the Swiss Parliament on that fateful September 30 that the accord “should not prevent us from executing and completing measures of a military, political, economic and spiritual order which our country needs to guard its independence and freedom.”45

  The Germans did, in fact, have further goals. On October 11, General (later, Field Marshal) Keitel telegraphed Hitler that Czechoslovakia could be finished off “in view of the present signs of weakness in Czech resistance.”46 This would be accomplished just a few months later.

  Shortly after Munich, German newspapers began referring to Switzerland as a country that was detaining populations which did not belong to her.47 On November 4, Federal President Baumann called a meeting of police chiefs to eliminate increasing Nazi activity in Switzerland.48 On the 10th, seeking evidence of espionage, police squads raided the headquarters of the Swiss Socialist Workers Party and the Peoples League, which were small but active fascist groups.49 Over 100 Nazi agitators were arrested. Baumann declared that evidence was found that the groups had maintained direct relations with Germany.50

  The Kristallnacht (Night of the Broken Glass) pogroms of November 9–10 in Germany sent shockwaves through Switzerland.51 The pretext for the attacks against Jews and Jewish property was revenge for the shooting of Ernst vom Rath, a Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris, by a Polish Jew. Berlin police announced the disarming of the Jews for what was called a new plot of the Jewish world conspiracy against National Socialism.52 The Swiss press did not lose sight of the parallel with the 1936 shooting of Swiss Nazi Wilhelm Gustloff by a Jewish medical student and the manner in which the Nazis used the incident to condemn all Jews and spread anti-Semitism.53

  Newspapers all over Germany published an article on November 9 declaring the need to disarm the Jews due to the Paris shooting. Yet this pretext was a sham: the confiscations of arms in Berlin had already been going on for several weeks, netting 2,589 swords, knives, and clubs, 1,702 firearms, and about 20,000 rounds of ammunition. A Berlin publication stated: “The provisional results clearly show what a large amount of weapons have been found with Berlin’s Jews and are still to be found with them.”54 The names of Jews with firearm licenses were available to the police under the Nazi Waffengesetz (Weapons Law) signed by Hitler and SS Reichsführer (Interior Minister) Wilhelm Frick earlier that year and previous laws.55 On November 10, newspapers in both Germany and Switzerland reported a document entitled “Weapons Ban for Jews” in which SS chief Heinrich Himmler decreed: “Persons who, according to the Nürnberg law are regarded as Jews, are forbidden to possess any weapons. Violators will be transferred to a concentration camp and imprisoned for a period of up to 20 years.”56

  The seizure of firearms from Jews
gave the Nazis assurance that their attacks would not be resisted. The Nazis then proceeded to smash, loot and burn Jewish shops and temples.57 Throughout Germany, thousands of Jewish men were taken from their homes and arrested.58 The property destruction was carried out by wrecking crews under the protection of uniformed Nazis or police.59 The Swiss press took note of the widespread disarming of the Jews and the anti- Semitic attacks.60

  The Regulations Against Jews’ Possession of Weapons (Verord-nung gegen den Waffenbesitz der Juden) were promulgated by Interior Minister Frick on November 11, the day after Kristallnacht. The regulations stated that “Jews . . . are prohibited from acquiring, possessing, and carrying firearms and ammunition, as well as truncheons or stabbing weapons. Those now possessing weapons and ammunition are required at once to turn them over to the local police authority.”61

  The Kristallnacht rampages prompted Swiss cantonal and federal authorities to clamp down on Nazi hooligans, whose activities were banned.62 The average Swiss, who kept a rifle at home for militia service and shooting matches, could not have lost sight of the significance of the Nazi seizures of firearms before attacking the Jews. Indeed, Switzerland was the only country in the world where every Jewish male, like every other citizen, was issued a rifle.

  The Völkischer Beobachter (People’s Observer), National Socialism’s chief newspaper, warned Switzerland on December 2 to curb her press in its treatment of Germany.63 The Berlin paper asserted: “If, therefore, small democratic States continue their indirect warfare against us they run the danger that of necessity we will one day legally consider them enemies, despite their neutral position, on the same basis as the world organizers of direct warfare.”64

  The next day, the Swiss responded. Giuseppe Motta, on behalf of the Federal Council, warned German Minister Köcher that Nazi agents in Switzerland must halt their activities. He also expressed “extreme displeasure” over remarks said to have been made repeatedly by Germans along the Swiss-German border that the two countries must become one.65

  In addition, on December 5 the Federal Council prohibited the publication of misinformation that endangered the Confederation, ridiculed democratic principles, or excited hatred against any group based on race, religion, or nationality. It authorized imprisonment of anyone who attempted to overthrow the constitutional regime of the Confederation or of the cantons. The Council was also empowered to dissolve any group that violated these prohibitions. Not surprisingly, the prohibitions were criticized as contrary to the principle of a free press.66

  Geneviève Tabouis, writing in the Parisian newspaper L’Oeuvre on December 8, substantiated beliefs widely held in Switzerland:

  It is reported that Herr von Bibra, counselor to the German Embassy at Berne, has recently received a secret order telling him particularly to encourage the National Socialist movement for the attachment of the German Swiss to the Reich. . . . By virtue of this order, Herr von Bibra has secretly received the title of “Special Commissar for the Attachment of Switzerland.”67

  As counselor to the German legation in Prague until late 1935, Bibra was instrumental in the spread of Nazi influence in Czechoslovakia. It was reported that Gestapo chief Himmler ordered Bibra to work toward the partition of Switzerland between Germany and Italy.68 By the end of the year, the Swiss government instructed its Attorney General to prosecute members of Nazi organizations for attacks against the security and independence of the Swiss Confederation.69

  In December, the obligation to serve in the Swiss militia was extended to age 60.70 Further, the Swiss Parliament approved an increased armament program that was expected to cost 350 million Swiss francs.71

  Hitler got a scare from a would-be William Tell in late 1938. A Swiss theology student, Maurice Bavaud, attempted to shoot Hitler on three occasions, actually getting very close to the dictator. Of all the assassination plots and attempts against Hitler during the entire Third Reich, Bavaud’s was one of the few that almost succeeded. He was caught and executed in 1941. It was one more reason for the Führer to hate the Swiss.72

  The Swiss concept of “spiritual national defense” was embodied in the December 1938 message of the Federal Council on national purpose. Authored by Federal Councillor Philipp Etter, the message noted the origins of Switzerland in the area around the St. Gotthard Pass in the Alps, the source of the Rhône, the Rhine, and the Ticino rivers. This mountain pass both separates and unites the three leading cultures of continental Europe—French, German and Italian—linking Switzerland to all three.73 It continued:

  For the very reason that we reject the concept of race or common descent as the basis of a state and as the factor determining political frontiers, we gain the liberty and the strength to remain conscious of our cultural ties with the three great civilizations. The Swiss national idea is not based upon race or biological factors; it rests on a spiritual decision.74

  The message added that Switzerland’s federalism allows various cultures to live in harmony:

  The Swiss federal state is an association of free republics: it does not swallow them, it federates them. The cantonal republics maintain their individuality, and thereby they are the sources and pillars of our intellectual wealth, the strongest bulwark against intellectual uniformity. Our Swiss democracy has been built up organically from the smaller units to the larger units, from the township to the canton, and from the canton to the federal state. Next to federalism and democracy, Switzerland is based upon respect for the dignity of the individual. The respect for the right and liberty of human personality is so deeply anchored in the Swiss idea that we can regard it as its basic concept and can proclaim its defense as an essential task of the nation.75

  While this was a special message from the Federal Council, the concept of “spiritual national defense” was not mandated by law, in the way National Socialism imposed ideology from above, but rather expressed the historic tradition of the Swiss people. The concept was promoted not only by the government but by various social institutions and organizations.76

  The Swiss Army is imbued with democratic principles. No generals exist other than as appointed by the Parliament in time of war and only a very small number of soldiers are full-time professionals.

  In the 1930s, Henri Guisan was a full-time colonel from the French-speaking part of the country. He was bilingual and commanded a German-speaking army corps before commanding a French-speaking corps.

  Colonel Guisan originally presented his Our People and Its Army as a lecture to the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich on October 9.77 When later published as a booklet, it was so well received that many people said that, should Switzerland ever need a general, this was the man.78 Indeed, Guisan would later be elected commander-in- chief of the Swiss Army when the war came.

  For Guisan, “a people defends itself in two ways: by its moral force, expressed by its patriotism, and by its material force, represented by its army.” Switzerland, he pointed out, originated in a military alliance: “the treaty of August 1, 1291 is nothing other than an offensive and defensive pact against the exterior enemy.”79 On the slopes of Morgarten in 1315, “the young army of Confederates” routed the army of Leopold I, and “Swiss tactics had been born.”80 Then there was Sempach in 1386, where 1,500 mountain dwellers crushed the army of the Archduke Leopold III. After Marignano (1515), one of the few Swiss defeats, Francis I, of France, said: “I overcame those that only Caesar had been able to overcome!”81

  The Swiss, said Guisan, had always been “united enough to withstand all the storms that shook Europe.” Obligatory service was imposed for the defense of the people. “For a long time it was the only communal institution of the cantons, the expression of confederate solidarity. The army represents, therefore, national unity, the binding element, not only in theory but in reality.”82 Guisan reflected:

  What distinguishes the military tradition of Switzerland, is, above all, the persistence with which its essential principles maintained themselves in the course of its history. . . . In eff
ect, the necessity “to be ready” at any instant required a mobilization and a quick concentration at the threatened points. Each citizen had his equipment, his arms, in his residence.83

  Reflecting on Swiss history, Guisan emphasized some of the specific ancient martial customs. In Appenzell, a young man at his confirmation received a sword and could not marry unless he possessed a Bible and arms.84 In Zurich, one was invited to a marriage by firing a pistol in front of the guest’s house.85 The day of recruitment was and remained a festival day, including processions with flags and music. “Today again,” Guisan emphasized, “being capable of service is a physical certificate of health; our girls know it well!”86

  In Geneva, since 1400, the military exercises of archers, crossbow shooters, arquebusiers, and elite bodies on which the state could rely embodied the very spirit of the city. All classes of the population were represented.87 The best shooters won trophies and cash and led parades while carrying their arms.88 At festivals, the ancient military influence was clear, and Guisan recounted colorful local traditions. Great battles had continued to be celebrated annually for over 500 years. The warrior spirit exhibited itself in the arts, literature, and architecture.89

  For Guisan, the army was the incarnation of the federal republic. He wrote bluntly: “The people is the army, the army is the people.” The people loved their army because they rediscovered themselves in it.90 “Under the uniform, the social differences equalize themselves,” he said, “the preconceived judgments disappear. Under the uniform, there is neither rich, nor poor, worker, employer, urbanite, or country person, there is only a soldier, a man who serves his country!”91 The common experiences brought the people together. Beginning with recruit school and continuing regularly throughout life, the soldiers were united. The army was education for citizenship.92

  In the army, one learned that there was “neither Swiss German, nor Swiss French, nor Swiss Italian, and that there was only one Switzerland, the one of our fathers, united, strong and vigilant.” But this strength was based on diversity. “If federalism is the safeguard of the country, unification would be its loss!” The cantons therefore retained their particularism, and the army regiments their unique characteristics. Guisan insisted, “It would be as vain to want to unify Switzerland as to attempt to level her mountains!” The very differences in fact promote national cohesion.93